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STATEMENT ON JURISDICTION 
This appeal is taken from a divorce decree entered in the Third Judicial District 
Court, State of Utah, by the Honorable Terry Christiansen. This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(h). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: 1. Whether the District Court erred in its failure to find that the Appellant 
("Mr. Romero") had a second mortgage on the condominium located at 416 East 
Creekside Circle # B, Murray, Utah 84107, which should have been used along with the 
Court's other findings regarding marital property, mortgages and remaining equity to 
calculate the parties' marital assets and debts and reach an equitable division of those 
marital assets. 
Standard of Review of Issue 1. The court should "defer to a trial court's factual 
findings unless there is clear error but review its legal conclusions for correctness. 
Richard v. Brown, 2009 WL 3463363, citing Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1241 (Utah 
1998). If a trial court's findings are incomplete, this Court may "order the trial court . . . 
to supplement, modify, or complete the findings to make them conform to the issues 
presented and the facts as found from the evidence and may direct the trial court ... to 
enter judgment in accordance with the findings as revised. Utah R. App. P. 30(a); 
Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, ffif 15-23, 176 P.3d 476, 481-84; Anderson 
v. Thompson, Not Reported in P.3d, 2008 WL 2058253 (Utah Ct. App. 2008). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND 
REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE 
APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1) (2009). 
Disposition of property — Maintenance and health care of parties and children — Division 
of debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and parent-time — 
Determination of alimony - Nonmeritorious petition for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders 
relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. 
Utah R. App. Proc. 3(a). See Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE. 
This case was tried before Judge Christensen on January 23, 2009, R. 309-310. 
Mr. Romero appeals the Third District Court's March 24, 2009, divorce decree denying 
Mr. Romero any equity interest in the parties' marital property located at 786 River 
Glenn Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah as inequitable because the District Court failed to 
include in its Decision and Findings of Facts a material debt. R. 342-343. 
Specifically, Mr. Romero appeals the Court's failure to find that Mr. Romero had 
a second mortgage on the condominium located at 416 East Creekside Circle # B, 
Murray, Utah 84107, which finding should have been used, along with the Court's other 
findings regarding marital property, mortgages and remaining equity, to calculate the 
parties' marital assets and debts and reach an equitable division of those marital assets. 
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B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant, Mr. Romero and Appellee, ("Mrs. Romero") were married in May 
2004. Prior to their marriage, Mrs. Romero owned a home located at 786 River Glen 
Drive, in Murray, Utah, and Mr. Romero owned a condominium located at 416 East 
Creekside # B in Murray, Utah. R. 318-319. 
At the time of the parties' marriage in May 2004, there was no equity existing in 
either Mr. Romero's condominium or Mrs. Romero's home. R. 319. In August 2004, Mr. 
Romero's name was added to the title of Mrs. Romero's home and in May 2006, a second 
mortgage in the amount of $31,000.00 was taken out on the home to replace a prior 
second mortgage existing on the home. R. 319. In January 2007 the parties separated and 
both filed for divorce. R. 1-4, 11-13, 320. This case was tried before Judge Christensen 
on January 23, 2009, R. 309-310. 
The Court found that the River Glen property was a marital asset with $67,000.00 
equity in the property. R. 379 p. 201. Although the court did not consider the 
condominium to be a martial asset, the Court found it fair to consider the $46,000.00 
equity in Mr. Romero's condominium in the division of the marital assets. R. 379 p. 202. 
Further, the court found the difference in equities of the property to be about $20,000.00. 
R. 379 p. 202. 
In valuing the property, the District Court found that the fair market value of Mrs. 
Romero's home, as of the date of separation, was $235,000.00 and that the fair market 
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value of Mr. Romero's was $122,000.00. R. 320. The District Court found that the debt 
owing on Mrs. Romero's home was $168,000.00, representing $31,000.00 on a second 
mortgage and $137,000.00 on a first mortgage. R. 320. The court also found the debt 
owing on Mr. Romero's condominium was $76,000.00 but the court failed to include in 
its calculation the second mortgage that existed on the condominium. R. 320, 379 pp 
206-07. 
At two different times during the trial Mr. Romero testified that the debt on his 
condominium included an $85,000.00 first mortgage and an approximately $23,000.00 
second mortgage. Mr. Romero testified to the first and second mortgage while being 
examined by Mrs. Romero's attorney and again on direct examination by Mr. Romero's 
attorney. R. 379 at pp. I l l , 123-24. Specifically, Mr. Romero testified that his 
remaining mortgage balance at the time of trial was approximately $76,000.00 but that he 
had acquired a second mortgage in November 2003 for an additional $23,000.00. R. 379 
pp. 109-11, 123-24. Additionally, Mr. Romero filed with the District Court a financial 
declaration noting that the debt owing on the condominium consisted of both a first 
mortgage, with an approximate value of $75,000.00, and a second mortgage, with an 
approximate value of $28,000.00. R. 74-79. 
In its Ruling and Findings of Facts, the District Court methodically calculated the 
equity of Mrs. Romero's home, identifying and valuing both the first and second 
mortgage in its calculation. R. 320. However, when calculating Mr. Romero's equity in 
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his condominium, the District Court identified and valued the first mortgage but failed to 
identify and value the second mortgage. R. 320. Mr. Romero's attorney brought this 
error to the District Court's attention by reiterating Appellant's testimony that there was 
both a first and second mortgage on the condominium and that the balance of $76,000.00 
represented only the first mortgage. R. 379 pp. 206-08. Mr. Romero's attorney also 
offered to file a motion to amend the record to clarify this fact. R. 379 p. 207. The 
District Court indicated it was unwilling to change its findings, stating that the division 
was "really about the same for each side" and that a subsequent motion to clarify the 
record "won't make any difference." R. 379 p. 207. 
In its findings regarding the division of property, the court found that the 
condominium was Mr. Romero's separate property and that, while the home was, 
originally the separate property of Mrs. Romero, it became marital property. R. 320. The 
District Court then used its equitable power to deviate from the general presumption that 
marital property be divided equally among the parties and concluded that since there was 
only an "insignificant" $20,000.00 difference in equity between the condominium and the 
home that the Mrs. Romero should be awarded all rights, title, and interest in the home 
and Mr. Romero should be awarded all rights and interests in the condominium. R. 321. 
On April 21, 2009 Mr. Romero filed a motion for appeal. R. 342-343. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Since the District Court failed to include in its calculation, Mr. Romero's 
$23,000.00 second mortgage, the difference in equity between the properties was not 
$21,000.00 but was actually $44,000.00, representing a difference between the equity in 
the home of $67,000.00 (FMV $235,000.00 - (1st mortgage of 137,000+ 2nd mortgage of 
$31,000.00)) and of the condominium of $23,000.00 (FMV $122,000.00 - (1st mortgage 
of $76,000.00 + 2nd mortgage of $23,000.00). 
The District Court's failure to identify and value the second mortgage on the 
condominium in its Decision or Findings of Fact is a reversible error. By not identifying 
the second mortgage in its distribution or explaining the reasoning behind this omission, 
the appeals court cannot effectively review whether the omission of the second mortgage 
resulted in a fair and equitable distribution of the party's marital property. Therefore, this 
court should order the District Court to supplement its findings of fact to include the 
second mortgage and to reconsider the distribution of assets based on the supplemented 
findings. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INCLUDE IN ITS 
FINDINGS MR. ROMERO'S SECOND MORTGAGE ON HIS 
CONDOMINIUM. 
Failure to identify and value all items of marital property and debt is a reversible 
error for which an appellate court should order the trial court to supplement its findings 
and reconsider the distribution of the marital property based upon those findings. Stevens 
v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 955-56 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); see also Stonehocker v. 
Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, ffif 15-23, 176 P.3d 476, 481-84 (finding that it was 
reversible error for the trial court not to assign values for all material marital property); 
Potter v. Potter, 845 P.2d 272, 274 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (finding that "the trial court's 
property distribution must be based on findings which place a dollar value on the 
distributed assets and liabilities"). 
In Stevens v. Stevens, this court found that failure to "identify the items of marital 
property and debt" and "assign values to each item of . . . debt" was a reversible error. 
Stevens, 754 P.2d at 955-56. In the Stevens case, the marital property consisted of several 
pieces of property all of which was heavily indebted and for which controversy existed 
over the amount of indebtedness each party should be responsible for. Id. Despite this 
controversy, the trial court failed to identify and value the large debt in its decision. Id. 
The appellate court reversed and remanded the trial court's decision because without a 
more precise statement of the parties' assets and liabilities it was unable to "perform [its] 
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reviewing function and determine whether the parties' property was equitably 
distributed." Id. 
Like the trial court in Stevens, the Third District Court committed reversible error 
by not identifying and valuing all items of material, debt and should be ordered to 
supplement its findings. In its Decision, the Third District Court failed to identify a 
material item of debt of $23,000.00 and failed to provide an explanation for its omission. 
As a result of this omission, when the District Court awarded the condominium to Mr. 
Romero and the home to Mrs. Romero, the relative value of Mr. Romero's marital 
property was overstated by approximately $23,000.00. Without a more precise statement 
for the District Court's reasoning for this omission, the appellate court cannot detemiine 
whether the distribution of marital assets was equitable. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Divorce Decree entered on March 24, 2009, by 
the Third District Court should be reversed. Appellant respectfully requests this Court to 
reverse the Third District Court's order and remand the case. 
DATED this day of November 2009. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
*atricia L. LafenppE 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 7 day of November 2009, I did cause a tme and 
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to be mailed, United States 
mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following: 
Richard S. Nemelka 
Nemelka & Nemelka 
6806 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
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ADDENDUM 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be taken from a 
district or juvenile court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal from all 
final orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of 
appeal with the clerk of the trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an 
appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect 
the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate court deems 
appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of 
dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees. 
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to appeal from a 
judgment or order and their interests are such as to make joinder practicable, they may 
file a joint notice of appeal or may join in an appeal of another party after filing separate 
timely notices of appeal. Joint appeals may proceed as a single appeal with a single 
appellant. Individual appeals may be consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its 
own motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the separate 
appeals. 
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as the appellant 
and the adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or proceeding shall not be 
changed in consequence of the appeal, except where otherwise directed by the appellate 
court. In original proceedings in the appellate court, the party making the original 
application shall be known as the petitioner and any other party as the respondent. 
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the party or parties 
taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from; 
shall designate the court from which the appeal is taken; and shall designate the court to 
which the appeal is taken. 
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give notice of the 
filing of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy thereof to counsel of 
record of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the party is not represented by 
counsel, then on the party at the party's last known address. A certificate evidencing such 
service shall be filed with the notice of appeal. If counsel of record is served, the 
certificate of service shall designate the name of the party represented by that counsel. 
(f) Filing fee in civil appeals. At the time of filing any notice of separate, joint, or 
cross appeal in a civil case, the party taking the appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial 
court the filing fee established by law. The clerk of the trial court shall not accept a notice 
of appeal regardless of whether the filing fee has been paid. Failure to pay the filing fee 
within a reasonable time may result in dismissal. 
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(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the trial 
court shall immediately transmit a certified copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date 
of its filing, and a statement by the clerk indicating whether the filing fee was paid and 
whether the cost bond required by Rule 6 was filed. Upon receipt of the copy of the 
notice of appeal, the clerk of the appellate court shall enter the appeal upon the docket. 
An appeal shall be docketed under the title given to the action in the trial court, with the 
appellant identified as such, but if the title does not contain the name of the appellant, 
such name shall be added to the title. 
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1 that you were addicted to porn, correct? 
2 A Why would I? 
3 Q Okay. 
4 A If I wasn't. 
5 Q Right. And you - when you and her went to 
6 counseling, you knew when she brought all of this up that she 
7 felt that you were addicted to pornography? 
8 A That was her statement, yes. 
9 Q Okay. And you still denied it at that time? 
10 A I still, yes. 
11 Q And didn't she tell you at that time in ^06 that she 
12 just found all of this information on the computer? 
13 A She stated that she made that statement, yes. 
14 Q Okay. And she was obviously really concerned about 
15 it? 
16 A She stated that to the counselor. 
17 Q Okay. And so she agreed to go to counseling with you 
18 to work on your problem with pornography? 
19 A No. That was not the reason for going to counseling. 
20 Q Okay. Do you know what the current mortgage balance 
21 is on your condominium? 
22 A As of today? 
23 Q Yeah. 
24 A It's approximately $115,000, I believe. 
25 Q $115,000? How much was it when you were married? 
1091 
1 THE COURT: Is that the balance owing or -
2 MR. NEMELKA: Yeah. The balance owing. 
3 THE WITNESS: Oh. 
4 Q (BY MR. NEMELKA) Your balance owing is $115,000? 
5 A Oh, the balance. No. 
6 Q To date. 
7 A I'm sorry. No. 
8 Q Okay. 
9 A Currently? 
10 Q Yes. 
11 | A Oh, the balance on the condo right now is 
12 approximately $76,000. I believe it is. 
13 I Q $76,000? 
14 A $76,000, correct. 
15 Q And what's the value? 
16 A Approximately $121,000. 
17 Q But you had an appraisal done on it, right? 
18 A Right. 
19 Q What did the appraisal say? 
20 A I believe it was $121,000, but -
21 Q Okay. 
22 A I'm not a hundred percent sure. 
23 Q Okay. And do you know what the balance was at the 
24 time you got married? 
25 A The balance of the just the mortgage payment? 
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1 Q Right. 
2 A I want to say at the time I got married, it had to 
3 have been about $183,000 - 84,000, I believe. 
4 Q $183,000? 
5 A I mean, I'm sorry. Eighty -
6 Q $83,000? 
7 A $84,000, approximately. 
8 Q Okay, all right. And do you have a second mortgage 
9 on the condo? 
10 A I do. 
11 Q Pardon? 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q And when did you take out the second mortgage? 
14 A I took it - I took one out in November of A03 for an 
15 amount of $23,500. 
16 Q That was before you got married? 
17 A Correct. 
18 Q Okay. But after you got married, did you take any 
19 more? 
20 A Yes. I took out another $5,000. 
21 Q When did you do that? 
22 A About February of 2007. 
23 Q Seven? 
24 A Correct. 
25 Q That was after you separated from -
1 where were you living? 
2 A At the condominium. 
3 Q At the time you purchased it? 
4 A Yes. Oh, I'm sorry. At the time I purchased the 
5 condominium? 
6 Q Yes. 
7 A Yeah. I was living in -
8 Q I think you testified that you purchased the 
9 I condominium in October of '03? 
10 A Right. 
11 Q And -
12 A Oh, yes, yes. I'm sorry. I was living at River Glen 
13 at the time. I'm sorry, yes. 
14 Q You were living with Ms. Romero? 
15 A Correct. 
16 Q And did - was she aware that you were buying the 
17 condo? 
18 A She was. 
19 Q Now, did you take out a second mortgage on the condo? 
20 A I did. 
21 Q And when did you take out that second mortgage? 
22 A November of 2003. 
23 Q How much equity was in the condo after you took out 
24 the second mortgage? 
25 I A I want to say approximately - I'm sorry. Repeat the 
123 
1 question. 
2 I Q So you purchased the property and you took out a 
3 second mortgage in November of *03. 
4 A Correct. 
5 Q I'm asking you after you took out that second 
6 mortgage, how much equity was in the condominium? 
7 A Oh, approximately $23,000, I believe it was. 
8 j Q After you took out the second mortgage? Let me go 
9 j back. 
10 j A Okay. 
i 
11 , Q How much was your second mortgage for? 
i 
12 I A $23,000. 
13 | Q And you took that out in November of A03? 
i 
14 ! A Correct. 
i 
15 I Q So now you have a first mortgage of about $85,000? 
16 j A Yes. 
17 I Q Yes. And you have a second mortgage of approximately 
18 $23,000? 
19 A Correct. 
20 Q So after that - those two mortgages, how much equity 
21 was in the condominium? 
22 A Oh, it was approx - probably zero. 
23 Q And how do you know that? 
24 A We checked, cause I maxed it out. 
25 Q You wanted to borrow as much as you could -
12 
1 presented, is about $168,000 - $31,000 on the second mortgage, 
2 and $137,000 on the first. The testimony as to the debt on the 
3 condominium was about $76,000. 
4 The Court has to make a determination based upon the 
5 case law cited as to the identity of the property in dispute to 
6 determine whether each item is a marital or separate property. 
7 The Court finds that nothing was done as it relates to the 
8 condominium to make it a marital asset. It was kept in Mr. 
9 Romero's sole name. He's the only one that made any payments 
10 on it. He took all control and management over that. 
11 I do find that the home was originally a separate 
12 asset of Mrs. Romero. It then became a marital asset for a 
13 number of reasons, the first of which is that - is Mr. Romero's 
14 name was placed on the property. He made a number of repairs 
15 and improvements to the property, and he made half of the 
16 mortgage payment for that property, and it was never considered 
17 by him as a rental payment. 
18 The Court next must consider whether there are 
19 exceptional circumstances that are from the general presumption 
20 that marital property be divided equally between the parties, 
21 and I find that there are those circumstances, and I will cite 
22 those as follows: Number one, it was the clear intent from the 
23 testimony of both Mrs. Romero and Mr. Romero that both 
24 properties would be put in both names. And had that been done, 
25 then there would have been a claim of title based upon deeds to 
201 
1 each property. 
2 Furthermore, I find it inherently unfair that Mr. 
3 Romero can receive $650 per month rent from his condominium, 
4 put it into his separate bank account, and not get any income 
5 from the home. It seems to me they should be treated 
6 similarly. And what he did is he took the rent on the 
7 condominium, put it into his own account. So he obtained all 
8 the equity in that property, and had a third party basically 
9 I pay his mortgage payment. Certainly, Mrs. Romero could have 
10 done the same thing had they moved into the condominium. I 
11 don't think would be fair to Mr. Romero if that property was 
12 leased to someone that she knew, or even just a tenant off the 
13 street, and then she kept all that money. 
14 J It seems to me this is fairly a novel case, because 
15 both parties come into this marriage, which is rather short in 
16 duration, with an asset with no equity. The values are not way 
17 different. There's, according to the Court calculations -
18 $67,000 equity in the home as of the date of separation. 
19 $46,000 equity in the condominium. That's about $20,000 
20 approximately. There's not that much difference. 
21 I do think, however, that there should be 
22 reimbursement for some of the repairs and improvements made on 
23 the property. Some there should not be. The picture window 
24 was installed at $500, but I think that is offset by the fact 
25 that there's $1,200 needed to repair the walls as a result of 
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1 Mrs. Romero said he did not. I just - I can't determine from 
2 the evidence who's correct and who isn't. There's $450 in 
3 dispute, and I'm just not in a position that I can say who is 
4 accurate and who isn't. So the burden hasn't been met as it 
5 relates to reimbursement of those funds. 
6 All right. I addressed the division of real 
7 property. I addressed reimbursement of marital funds, grounds 
8 for annulment and attorney's fees. Anything the Court has not 
9 addressed? 
10 MS. LATULIPPE: The only question I have, Your Honor 
11 J - and if the Court would like, I can file a motion - a 
12 subsequent motion, but I believe the testimony on the mortgage 
13 on the condo was that there was a first mortgage for $83,000 
14 and a second mortgage for $22,000. And so the number of 
15 $73,000 on the mortgage, I believe that's - or $76,000 debt on 
16 the condo, I believe that's just on the first mortgage. 
17 MR. NEMELKA: But there's also testimony that my 
18 client knew nothing about the second mortgage. 
19 THE COURT: Yeah. He testified -
20 MR. NEMELKA: He took it out. 
21 THE COURT: He testified that there was $76,000 
22 balance on the condo, and the value was $121,000. 
23 MR. NEMELKA: Right. 
24 THE COURT: That was my - what I wrote down. 
25 MS. LATULIPPE: But I think there was a clarification 
2061 
1 right after that, Your Honor, that it was - that's what he 
2 thinks the value on the first mortgage was, but he testified 
3 that the month after he bought the condo in November, 2003, he 
4 took out another mortgage on the property for approximately -
5 THE COURT: Yeah, but I'm not looking at the 2003 
6 value. I'm looking at the 2007 value, and his testimony was 
7 that there was $76,000 owing on the condominium, and he 
8 estimated the value at a $121,000. 
9 MR. NEMELKA: That's correct. 
10 I MS. LATULIPPE: But when - I think his testimony was, 
11 and I can go through the record, but I think his testimony was 
12 that he's continued to maintain the second mortgage as well. 
13 There are two mortgages on the condo just like there are two 
14 mortgages on the River Glen property. 
15 THE COURT: I thought it was ironic that both second 
16 mortgages were used to pay off individual debts from the 
17 individual parties. I mean, so it's really about the same for 
18 each side and -
19 MS. LATULIPPE: But my - and I - if you want me to 
20 file a motion, I will. But if we can deal it with it here -
21 THE COURT: It won't make any difference. 
22 MS. LATULIPPE: Because my concern is, in looking at 
23 the River Glen property, you took into consideration the first 
24 and the second mortgage. But when you looked at the 
25 condominium, you only took into consideration the first 
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1 mortgage, not the second mortgage when you were calculating the 
2 value. And both of those mortgages are still on the property, 
3 THE COURT: Well, I base my decision on the testimony 
4 that was presented, and that was the testimony that I heard 
5 from your client. So that's where I'm taking it from. All 
6 right. Mr. Nemelka, I'll have you prepare the findings of 
7 I facts and conclusions of law in the decree of divorce, 
MR. NEMELKA: Thank you, Your Honor. In regard to 
9 I getting a copy of your ruling, do we do that through that here? 
10 THE COURT: Just talk to my clerk. I do need those 
11 exhibits. I've got - Roy, do you want to get those for me? 
12 ROY: I will. 
13 THE COURT: Does counsel want the courtesy copies 
14 back? 
15 MR. NEMELKA: No, 
16 THE COURT: Or throw them away? 
17 MS. LATULIPPE: I don't, Your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. I've just got the originals in the 
19 file. All right. Court's in recess, 
20 J (Whereupon the trial was concluded) 
21 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT 
ALICE M. ROMERO, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
MANUEL ROMERO, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No.074400280 
Judge : CHRISTIANSEN 
The trial in the above matter came on before the Court on the 23rd of January 2009 before the 
Honorable Terry Christiansen, Petitioner being present and represented by Richard S. Nemeika and 
Respondent being present and represented by Patricia LaTulippe and witness having been sworn and 
testified and exhibits having been admitted and the court having reviewed the same and the parties 
having previously stipulated to the resolution of all but four issues and good cause appearing 
therefore, the Court hereby finds as follows: 
THIRD DISJRTCT COURT 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That Petitioner is a bona fide resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and has 
been for more than three (3) months pnor to the commencement of this action 
2. That Petitioner and Respondent were married on the 1st day of May, 2004, in Las 
Vegas, State of Nevada, and now are and ever since have been husband and wife 
3. Petitioner testified that pnor to the marriage the Respondent failed to disclose 
information to her in regard to his financial honesty and his involvement with another woman and 
pornography The Respondent testified and the Petitioner acknowledged that she went to a swingers 
bar with him pnor to getting married and also knew about the affair with another woman. The Court 
finds that the Petitioner failed to meet her burden to establish fraud going to the essence of the 
marriage and of such a degree that it defeated the essential purpose of the injured spouse inherent 
in the contracting of the marriage Therefore, Petitioner's request for an annulment is denied. 
3 That during the course of the marriage various irreconcilable differences arose 
between the parties herein making it impossible for Petitioner to continue this mamage, and 
Petitioner is entitled to a Decree of Divorce severing the bonds of matrimony between the parties 
herein. 
5. That no minor children have been born as issue of this mamage 
6. That both parties are currently employed and capable of supporting themselves and 
therefore neither party should be awarded alimony and the same should be waived. 
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7 That the Petitioner owned a home and residence prior to the marriage located at 786 
River Glen Drive m Murray, Utah, and the Respondent owned a condominium which he acquired 
prior to the marriage located at 416 East Creekside # B in Murray, Utah 
8 The court finds that Petitioner purchased her home in 1998 with a boyfriend In 1998 
she took out a second mortgage for $20,000 00 to cash out the boyfriend She paid $8,000 00 to 
the boyfriend for his down payment and for any equity accumulated against the balance for 
debts In April of 2003, Respondent moved into the property and paid her $563 00 which was 
approximately half of the house payment At that time his name was not on the property The 
Pantes got married over a year later m May 2004 and then m August 2004 Respondent's name 
was added to the title of the property (Exhibit C) There is testimony that there was conversation 
between the parties that not only Mr Romero's name be added to the home but that Mrs 
Romero's name would be added to the condo that Mr Romero had purchased prior to the 
marriage 
9 As it relates to the condo the court finds that the property was purchased from 
Respondent's nephew in 2003 for approx $85,000 00 , and the court finds that at the time of the 
mamage in 2004 there was no equity in either the home originally purchased by Mrs Romero or 
the condo originally purchased by Mr Romero 
10 In May 2006, a second mortgage was placed on Petitioner's home in the amount 
of $31,000 00 and it replaced the prior $20,000 second mortgage Most of that equity was used 
to pay off Mrs Romero's debts 
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11 In January 2007 the parties separated and the court finds that the fair market value 
of the properties should be valued at that time for the reason that Mr Romero quit making 
payments on the Petitioner's home after he left in January of 2007 Both parties paid their own 
mortgage payments after that date The Court finds that the fair market value of the Petitioner's 
home as of the date of separation was $235,000 The Court finds that the fair market value of 
the condo or Respondent's home at the date of separation was $122,000 The debt owing on the 
Petitioner's home based on exhibits presented was about $168,000, $31,000 on the second 
mortgage and $137,000 on the first mortgage The testimony as to the debt on the condo or 
Respondent's home indicated it was about $76,000 
12 The court has to make a determination based upon the case law cited as to the 
identity of the property m dispute to determine whether each item is martial or separate property 
The court finds that nothing was done as it relates to the condo to make it a martial asset It was 
kept in Mr Romero's sole name, he was the only one who made any payments upon it, and he 
took all control and management over it The Court finds that the home originally was a separate 
asset of Mrs Romero, but then became a marital asset for a number of reasons First of which 
was that Mr Romero's name was placed on the property, he made a number of repairs and 
improvements to the property and he made half of the mortgage payment for that property and it 
was never considered by him as a rental payment 
13 The court next must consider whether there are exceptional circumstances that 
would warrant the Court deviating from the general presumption that martial property be divided 
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equally between the parties. The Court finds that there are exceptional circumstances as 
follows: 
A. It was the clear intent from the testimony of both Mrs. Romero and Mr. 
Romero that both properties would be put in both names and had that been done then there would 
have been a claim of title based upon the deeds to each property. 
B. Furthermore, the Court finds it inherently unfair that Mr. Romero can receive 
$650 per month rent from his condo and put it in his separate bank account. What he did is he 
took the rent on the condo and put it in his own account so he obtained all the equity in that 
property and had a third party basically pay his mortgage payment to Mrs. Romero for her home.. 
Certainly Mrs. Romero could have done the same thing if they would have moved into the condo. 
That would not have been fair to Mr. Romero if the home was leased to someone that Mrs. 
Romero knew or a tenant off the street and she kept all that money. 
14. It seems to the Court that this a fairly novel case because both parties came into this 
marriage, which was rather short in duration, with an asset with no equity. The values of the 
properties according to the court calculations are $67,000 equity in the home as of the date of 
separation, and $46,000 equity in the condo. That's approximately $20,000 which is not that 
much difference. Therefore, the Petitioner shall be awarded all rights, title and interest in her 
home located at 786 River Glen Drive in Murray, Utah and the Respondent shall be awarded all 
rights, title and interest in his condo located at 416 East Creekside #B in Murray, Utah, each free 
and clear of any interest, claim or equity of the other party except as stated herein. Further, both 
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parties shall sign and execute any and all deeds or documents necessary to transfer title as stated 
above or to obtain refinancing as required herein. 
15. The Court finds however that there should be reimbursement for some of the 
repairs and improvements made on the property, and some there should not be. The picture 
window was installed for $500 but I think that is offset by the fact there is $1200 needed to repair 
the walls as a result of the picture window being placed in the home improperly. The stepping 
stones in the yard are minimal as are painting three walls in the garage and putting in the sink and 
kitchen faucets in the kitchen and the bathroom. They were purchased for minimal amounts as 
were the wire shelves for $15-20 dollars. However, the patio roof is somewhat different, and the 
Court finds this is an improvement to the home and not just a minor repair. It is reasonable to 
order that there be a reimbursement from Mrs. Romero to Mr. Romero for the patio roof, but the 
Court doesn't have sufficient evidence to determine that amount. Counsel for both parties shall, 
look at the documentation, share their documentation and if they cannot agree you the parties can 
come back and present evidence on the issue, but the court's ruling is whatever Mr. Romero paid 
for the patio cover will be reimbursed because that is an improvement to the home. If the parties 
cannot agree on the value and the issue is brought back then the Court is willing to assess 
attorney's fees to the party who loses. 
16. The Court finds that the landscaping work was of little value, but any tools 
purchased by Mr. Romero should be returned to him for reuse in landscaping. The same thing 
with the fans in the bedroom and in the garage, those are also minimal expenses. The nephew 
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put them in. The painting, and furnace repair goes along with the home. Further repairing any 
leaks, railings, and the shelving are not substantial enough to give an offset. 
17. It is reasonable that Mrs. Romero refinance the second mortgage within 90 days 
and that Mr. Romero's name be taken off the second mortgage so his credit is not affected in any 
manner. 
18. It is reasonable that if Mr. Romero elects to do so he can take back the shed that 
he purchased to put his stuff on the property. If he doesn't take it off in the next 30 days, then he 
will have waived any right to take over the shed. 
19. Next issue is the $650 that was allegedly taken by Mrs. Romero to pay the 
January 2007 mortgage payment and the $200 of which was apparently returned. The Court does 
not find that either party has met their burden with respect to that, the testimony is conflicting. 
Mr. Romero testify that he paid the January payment of about $500 and Mrs. Romero said he did 
not. The Court cannot determine from the evidence who's correct and who isn't. 
8. That during the marriage the parties acquired certain items of personal property 
and it is reasonable that each party be awarded all of the items of personal property that were in 
their possession at the time of the separation of the parties, which was the 20th of January, 2007. 
Further it is reasonable that each party be awarded all those items of personal property in their 
name only including but no limited to checking accounts, savings accounts, stocks, bonds and 
other assets. 
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9. During the marriage the parties acquired an interest in retirement benefits and 
accounts and it is reasonable that each party be awarded their own retirement benefits and 
accounts including but not limited to 401K's, IRS's and pensions. 
10. It is reasonable that each party assume and pay those debts and obligations 
incurred by that party prior to the marriage, and that each party assume and pay any and all debts 
and obligations incurred by the party in their own name during the marriage. 
11. It is reasonable that each party be awarded all their premarital assets. 
12. It is reasonable that the Petitioner be restored her maiden name of Maestas. 
13. It is reasonable that each party pay their own attorney's fees and costs incurred in 
this matter based upon the Court's finding that the parties earn approximately the same amount 
of income and neither has a financial need where they cannot pay their own attorney's fees. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now enters it's Conclusions of 
Law. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Petitioner is entitled to a Decree of Divorce severing the bonds of matrimony 
between the parties herein the same to become final upon signing and filing with the court. 
2. The Decree of Divorce shall be consistent with the terms and provisions as stated 
herein above. 
DATED this day of March, 2009. 
BY THE COURT 
Approved as to form 
Honorable Terry Christiansen, District Court Judge 
Patricia LaTulippe, Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Findings to the following, postage 
prepaid, this JS day of March 2009. 
Patricia LaTulippe 
Attorney at Law 
5217 South State Street, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT 
ALICE M. ROMERO 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
MANUEL ROMERO, 
Respondent. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Case No.074400280 
Judge : TERRY CHRISTIANSEN 
The trial in the above matter came on before the Court on the 23rd of January 2009 before 
the Honorable Terry Christiansen, Petitioner being present and represented by Richard S. 
Nemelka and Respondent being present and represented by Patricia LaTulippe and witness 
having been sworn and testified and exhibits having been admitted and the court having reviewed 
the same and the parties having previously stipulated to the resolution of all but four issues and 
the Court having entered it's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing 
therefore, 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS 
1 The Petitioner is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce severing the bonds of 
matnmony between the parties herein, with the same to be final upon entry 
2 The Petitioner shall be awarded all rights, title and interest in her home located at 786 
River Glen Drive in Murray, Utah and the Respondent shall be awarded all rights, title and 
interest in his condo located at 416 East Creekside #B in Murray, Utah, each free and clear of any 
interest, claim or equity of the other party except as stated herein Further, both parties shall sign 
and execute any and all deeds or documents necessary to transfer title as stated above or to obtain 
refinancing as required herein 
3 It is hereby ordered that there be a reimbursement from Mrs Romero to Mr Romero 
for the patio roof, but the Court doesn't have sufficient evidence to determine that amount 
Counsel for both parties shall, look at the documentation, share their documentation and if they 
cannot agree you the parties can come back and present evidence on the issue, but the court's 
ruling is whatever Mr Romero paid for the patio cover will be reimbursed because that is an 
improvement to the home Lf the parties cannot agree on the value and the issue is brought back 
then the Court is willing to assess attorney's fees to the party who loses 
4 Any tools purchased by Mr Romero should be returned to him for reuse in 
landscaping 
5 Mrs Romero shall refinance the second mortgage within 90 days and Mr Romero's 
name shall be taken off the second mortgage so his credit is not affected in any manner 
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6. Mr. Romero may elect to take back the shed that he purchased to put his stuff on the 
property. If he doesn't take it off in the next 30 days, then he will have waived any right to take 
over the shed. 
8. Each party is awarded all of the items of personal property that were in their 
possession at the time of the separation of the parties, which was the 20th of January, 2007. 
Further, each party is awarded all those items of personal property in their name only including 
but no limited to checking accounts, savings accounts, stocks, bonds and other assets. 
9. Each party is awarded their own retirement benefits and accounts including but not 
limited to 401K's, ERS's and pensions. 
10. Each party shall assume and pay those debts and obligations incurred by that party 
prior to the marriage, and that each party shall assume and pay any and all debts and obligations 
incurred by the party in their own name during the marriage. 
11. Each party be awarded all their premarital assets. 
12. The Petitioner is restored her maiden name of Maestas. 
13. Each party pay their own attorney's fees and costs incurred in this matter. 
DATED this 2*f day of March, 2009. 
Approved as to form 
Patricia LaTulippe 
BY THE COURT 
Honorable Terry Christiansen, District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Decree to the following, postage 
prepaid, this 3 day of March 2009. 
Patricia LaTulippe 
Attorney at Law 
5217 South State Street, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
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